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S1~ATE

OF UTAH
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C. A. SAVAGE, KENNETH C. SA VAGE, C. A. SAVAGE, doing business as
SAVAGE COAL AND TIMBER COMPANY, and SAVAGE COAL AND
TIMBER COMPANY,
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Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in appellant's brief
represents but a partial excerpt of the facts and is argumentative in form. We feel it necessary to restate these
facts for the benefit of the court.
Plaintiff, Delta H. Lewis, and her husband, Dow T.
Lewis, were residents of Montana. They left Whitehall on
August 1, 1955, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening,
with their final destination being Salt Lake City. They
stopped in Idaho Falls and then proceeded to Alameda, just
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outside of Pocatello, where the accident occurred. They
reached that point at approximately 4:45 A.M. on AP~ust
2nd.
The highway is two lanes from Chubbeck until it
reaches Alameda, where it goes to a newly improved highway of four traveling lanes and an outer lane for part time
parking. Where the two lanes go into the new highway
there is an intersection with a stop light. Mr. Lewis was
driving and had been traveling at about 50 miles per hour.
The semaphore was green and when he passed the intersection and entered the new highway he turned from the
left or center lane, across the next lane to the extreme
righthand lane and struck the left rear end of defendants'
truck which was stopped in the outside or righthand lane.
Mr. Lewis did not see the defendants' truck until he was
right on it. (T. 9-16)
After the accident Mr. Lewis observed that the lights
were on in the truck and there were red flags located on
the back of the lumber. The truck was stopped under a
street light some 250 to 300 feet from the intersection with
the semaphore. The street was fully lighted and dawn had
broken and it was light enough to distinguish objects on,
ahead and to the side of the road. At the time of the accident there was a milk truck traveling north about a full
block south of the point of impact. There was very little
traffic on the road that morning. Mr. Lewis' lights were
good and he passed no cars going his way when the accident
occurred, nor were there any cars in front of him going
his way.
The course taken by Mr. Lewis' car from the intersection to the point of impact, together with the physical con-
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clition of the road, are represented on the exhibits introdu.cv::l in evidence. (T. 16-39)
The speed limit where the accident occurred is 3 5 miles
per hour.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S HUSBAND
WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF WAS GUlL TY OF NEGLIGENCE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S HUSBAND
WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
The record amply discloses that there can be no question as to the negligence of plaintiff's husband. The law
of Idaho is the same as the law of Utah, which requires
that a person driving an automobile must proceed at such
a rate of speed that he may ordinarily be able to stop and
avoid striking an object ahead of him which a prudent
driver would see. Maier v. Minidoka County Motor Company, 105 P. 2d 1076. In that case the court said:
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((Generally it is evidence as a matter of law,
or at least strong evidence of negligence, for a
motorist to operate his automobile on a highway at
such a speed that the automobile cannot be stopped
within the distance within which objects can be
seen ahead of the automobile."
The court continued and also addressed itself to the question of proximate cause, and its holding is even more
conclusive in this case because plaintiffs urges violation of
an ordinance as constituting negligence. The Idaho court
said this:
((Appellants urge in effect that traveling on
the highway on a bicycle at night without a lighted
headlamp as provided by statute constitutes negligence and therefore contributory negligence as a
matter of law was proven. In Tendoy v. West,
supra (51 Idaho 679, 9 P. 2d 1027), this court
stated: (In the absence of some probable causal connection, bald negligence per se can raise no presumption of proximate cause: it may be wholly
innocent. It is no more effective than any other
kind of negligence. Where, on the question of
proximate cause, men's minds may honestly differ,
it should always be submitted to the jury. Kelly
v. Troy Laundry Co., supra (46 Idaho 214, 267 P.
222); Hooker v. Schuler, 45 Idaho 83, 260 P. 1027;
Hall v. Hepp, 210 App. Div. 149, 205 N.Y.S. 474,
holding that the violation of a traffic law must be
established as the proximate cause of the injury,
the question being one of fact, citing Clark v.
Doolittle, 205 App. Div. 697, 199 N.Y.S. 814;
Martin v. Oregon Stages, 129 Or. 435, 277 P. 291,
294, asking the pertinent question, uwas the absence of a white light the approximate cause of the
collision?" After declaring the plaintiff guilty of
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negligence per se for driving after sundown without a taillight, the court said in Gleason v. Lowe,
232 Mich. 300, 205 N. W. 199, 200, ((It was a
question of fact for the jury whether there was
any causal connection between the statutory violation of plaintiff and the injury occasioned by defendant"; Martin v. Carruthers, 69 Colo. 464, 195
P. 105, 106, conceding plaintiff's negligence per se,
but declaring, ((There is room for two opinions
under the evidence as to whether that negligence
was a cause contributing to the collision." To the
same effect are Darby v. Jarrett, 26 Ohio App. 194,
15 9 N. E. 8 58 ; Giorgetti v. Wollaston, 8 3 Cal. A pp.
358, 257 P. 109. But it is unnecessary to multiply
authority.' "
Mr. Lewis drove into the rear of defendants' truck
when he had two full lanes of unobstructed space to pass
the truck; the truck was lighted with a taillight and two
clearance lights in the rear with red flags on each corner
of the lumber, and was under a street light where it was
clearly visible. In fact, Mr. Lewis testified to the fact
that the red flags were on the back of the truck and that
the lights were on and he, in fact, had no difficulty seeing
the milk truck coming about a block away and identified
it as a truck. The only conclusion that can be reached
from his own testimony is that he was either going too
fast to turn and avoid the end of the truck, or he was
negligently not paying attention to where he was driving.
Plaintiff repeatedly refers to circumstances which the
record does not support, namely, a time element of half
an hour that Officer Wharton purportedly saw the truck
stand before the disaster. A careful reading of the record
would indicate that Officer Wharton saw the lumber truck
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and then went about his errands; that the accident occurred while he was so occupied and that he came upon the
scene sometime after it had happened. He substantiated
the testimony of the defendants that they had stopped
only for the purpose of adjusting the load and were ready
to start when the accident occurred. Officer Wharton
also testified that the lane where the truck was parked was
considered a parking lane by him, and that there were no
signs to advise the defendants of anything to the contrary
until another block farther south, and it could not be
read from the truck stopped where it was. We submit
that the negligence of Mr. Lewis is so glaring as to defy
any other conclusion.
It is obvious in this case that Mr. Lewis' negligence
was the sole proximate cause of the accident, and Mrs.
Lewis should not be allowed to recover. The defendants
were doing what they had a right to do as they were
stopped to check the load and to tighten the binders. There
is no violation of an ordinance prohibiting parking. Section 49-521 (d) of the Idaho Code defines upark" as follows:
u (d) (Park'-When prohibited means the
standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not,
otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and
while actually engaged in loading or unloading."
The Idaho law has been construed and the Idaho Court
has held that the statute forbidding parking at night on a
highway was not violated when a truck stopped because of
engine trouble. State v. Hintz, 102 P. 2d 639. In addition, the general rule of law throughout the United States
seems to be that upark" means something more than mere
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temporary or momentary stoppage on a road for a necessary purpose. Such things as changing a tire or engine
trouble, or loading or unloading, or adjusting a load, have
been held not to be in violation of the statute or ordinance.
See Motor Lines v. Gillette, 177 So. 881, 235 Ala. 157;
Marinkovich v. Tierney, 17 P. 2d 93, 93 Mont. 72; State
v. Carter, 172 S. E. 415,205 N.C. 761; Palmer v. Marceille,
175 A. 31, 106 Vt. 500; Martin v. Oregon Stages, 277 P.
291, 129 Ore. 435; Fontaine v. Charas, 181 A. 417, 87
N.H. 424; Tibbetts v. Dunton, 174 A. 453, 133 Me. 128;
Stallings v. Buchan Transport Co., 185 S. E. 643,210 N.C.
201; Fleming v. Flick, 35 P. 2d 210, 140 Cal. App. 14;
Hartwell v. Progressive Transp. Co., 270 N. W. 570, 198
Minn. 488. The foregoing are but a few of many cases
all holding the same.
Although plaintiff alleged the violation of an ordinance, and we submit no violation occurred in this case,
the law is generally recognized that the question of proximate cause must be resolved. Even if the court should consider that a possible violation of the ordinance occurred,
such violation could not have been a proximate cause of
this accident. No emergency occurred which would have
prevented Mr. Lewis from both seeing and avoiding the
truck, and the truck did not block the highway in any
degree sufficient to have caused the accident. In fact,
Officer Wharton testified that the right wheels of the
truck were right up against the curb. Counsel has cited
the case of Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 263 P. 2d
287. That case dealt with the question of proximate cause.
The only possibility of the violation of an ordinance being
a proximate cause of that accident was that the driver of
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the vehicle was unable to pass the truck because of oncoming traffic. No such circumstance exists in this case
and the only thing that caused the accident was the failure of Mr. Lewis to keep his car under control sufficiently
to drive down the highway in two free lanes of traffic, or
more if he needed it, or to drive at a speed that was reasonable and safe under the circumstances, or to see a well
lighted truck under a street light at a time when it was
light enough to have seen a truck apparently with or without lights.
In plaintiff's brief counsel urge that the sanctity according to the verdict of the jury on conflict of the evidence is not present here. Surely counsel cannot apply a
different rule of law to the sanctity of the court sitting
as a jury. The court below tried the case and decided the
same upon the facts, the defendant having prevailed. This
court must consider the evidence and every reasonable inference in a light most favorable to the defendant. Jensen
v. Mower, 294, P. 2d 683.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF WAS GUlLTY OF NEGLIGENCE.
Plaintiff has stressed the point that the laws of Idaho
are presumed to be the same as the laws of Utah in the
absence of proof to the contrary, and the courts will not
take judicial notice of foreign law. Although no pretrial
order was entered in this case, a pretrial was had and counsel in open court discussed the laws of the State of Idaho
governing this case and the doctrine of imputed negligence. One of counsel stated to the court that he had not
considered the law of Idaho and desired time within which
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to study the matter. At this pretrial we urged the court
to consider the dismissal of the case on the doctrine of imputed negligence and this particular issue of law was
formed. It is our understanding that when issues of fact
and questions of law have been formed at pretrial, under
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure no proof is required at
the trial. The very purpose of the Rules is to avoid a
multiplicity of proof. We submit it was fully understood
by court and counsel that if the court determined that
under the laws of Idaho the doctrine of imputed negligence existed, and if the court found negligence on the
part of Mr. Lewis, there could be no recovery by plaintiff.
The laws of the state where the accident occurred
control the rights and liabilities of the parties. In Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Vol. 9,
Sec. 579, pages 31, 36 and 37, the rule is given:
((Where an accident occurs in one state, and
the suit is brought in another, the question may
arise as to whether the laws of the forum or the
laws of the state where the accident occurred control. The rights and liabilities of parties in automobile accidents, as a general rule, are determined by
the laws of the state where the accident occurred. ,... ,... *
uThus, under the law of the state where the
injury occurs, the action may survive against the
estate of the tort-feasor, but the right of action
may not survive under the law of the state where
the suit is brought. In such case, the right of action
depends upon the law of the state where the injury
occurs, rather than of the jurisdiction where the
suit is brought. * * *
rr A

rule of law of the place where the accident
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occurs with reference to imputing the negligence
of a motorist to a guest or other occupant riding
in the automobile is deemed a rule of substantive
law rather than merely a rule of evidence, and
hence is controlling, though the lex fori be different." (Emphasis ours)
The foregoing authority cites the case of W. W. Clyde
& Co. v. Dyess, 126 F. 2d 719, (C.C.A. lOth, 1942). This
case is most interesting because of the similarity of the
accident, and the wife sued to recover for personal injuries, alleging she was a guest in herhusband's automobile.
The accident happened in Utah and the court held that
the law of Utah applied, rather than Texas where community property applied:
((The right to recover damages for personal
injuries is a property right in that state, and a
chose in action for such injuries suffered by a married woman belongs to the community estate. Ezell
v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331; Texas Central Ry. Co. v.
Burnett, 61 Tex. 6 3 8 ; Northern Texas Traction
Co. v. Hill, Tex. Civ. App., 297 S.W. 778; Bostick
v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 81 S.W.
2d 216. And recovery cannot be had in that state
for personal injuries sustained there by a married
woman if the negligence of her husband was a contributing cause, for the reason that such negligence
on his part is imputed to her. Missouri Pac. Ry.
Co. v. White, 80 Tex. 2025, 15 S.W. 808; Texas &
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rea, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 549, 65
S. W. 1115 ; Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill,
supra; Bostick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., supra; Dallas
Ry. & Terminal Co. v. High, 129 Tex. 219, 103
s.w. 2d 735.
((But with rare exceptions matters relating to
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the right of action arising out of a tort which results in death, personal injury, or other wrong, are
governed by the law of the place where the tort
occurred. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190, 14 S. Ct. 978, 38 L.Ed. 958;
Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194,
U.S. 120, 24 S. Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 900; American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29
S. Ct. 511, 53 L.Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047; Cuba
Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 32 S. Ct. 132,
56 L.Ed. 274, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 40; Vancouver
Steamship Co., Ltd., v. Rice, Administratrix, 288
U.S. 445, 53 S. Ct. 420, 77 L.Ed. 885; Young v.
Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599, 77 L.Ed. 1158,
88 A.L.R. 170; Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 2 Cir.,
110 F. 2d 970, 133 A.L.R. 255. And ordinarily
where a tort is committed in one state and recovery
of damages is sought in another, the substantive
rights of the parties are governed by the law of the
former while questions of remedy or procedure are
referable to the law of the latter. O'Neal v. Caffarello, 303 Ill. App. 574, 25 N.E. 2d 534; Meyer
v. Weimaster, 278 Mich. 370, 270 N.W. 715;
Laughlin v. Michigan Motor Freight Lines, 276
Mich. 545, 268 N.W. 887; Sutton v. Bland, 166
Va. 132, 184 S.E. 231; Wood v. Shrewsbury, 117
W. Va. 569, 186 S.E. 294; Farfour v. Fahad, 214
N.C. 281, 199 S.E. 521.
ttThis accident occurred in Utah and the suit
was instituted there. The place of the wrong and
that of the forum concurred. And the community
property system does not obtain there. More than
that, the material part of section 40-2-4, Revised
Statutes of Utah 1933, provides in substance that
the husband shall have no right of recovery for
personal injuries to the wife, that the wife may
recover for such injuries as though she were un-
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married and that the recovery shall include medical
and other expenses paid or assumed by the husband. No case has been called to our attention in
which the statute was construed. We are, therefore, obliged to proceed without direction or guidance by the supreme court of the state in respect
to the meaning of the local statute. We think the
statute, when fairly construed, embraces both substantive and remedial elements. It strips the husband of any right of recovery for personal injuries
sustained by the wife arising out of the tort of a
third person, and it vests in her the right to recover
for such a wrong as though she were an unmarried woman~ It places a married woman on equal
footing with an unmarried woman in respect to
redress for personal injuries growing out of a tort.
It empowers a married woman to maintain in her
own name a suit to recover for such injuries and it
vests in her the recovery therefor to the same extent
and for all purposes as though she were a single
woman. Cf. Jacobson v. Fullerton, 181 Iowa 1195,
165 N.W. 358. And it fails to indicate any purpose
to distinguish between residents and nonresidents
of the state."
We call the court's attention to the cases of Traglio
v. Harris, 104 F. 2d 439; Venuto v. Robinson, 118 F. 2d
679; Muraszki v. William L. Clifford, Inc., 26 A.2d 578;
Skillman v. Conner, 193 A. 563 and Myrick v. Griffin, 200
So. 383.
We submit to the court that the universal rule of law
is to the effect that the law of Idaho, where the accident
occurred, would apply in this case, and the negligence of
the husband would be imputed to the wife and bar recovery.
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CONCLUSION
From all of the evidence and a reading of the record
it becomes most evident that the court correctly found
that Dow Ted Lewis, plaintiff's husband, was guilty of
negligence in the manner in which he was driving, and
that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries and damages; that he drove in such a
manner that he failed to see what was evident, open and
obvious and that he drove in such a manner that he could
not stop in time to avoid striking defendant's truck.
It is also obvious from all of the testimony in the case
that defendants were not guilty of violating any ordinance,
and even if they had, the court found as a rna tter of fact
that the defendants were not guilty of any negligence
which was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries and
damages. Such a finding on the part of the trier of the
fact should not be disturbed.
Further, under the laws of the State of Idaho the
negligence of the husband is imputed to the wife, and
although the decision in this case by the trier of the fact
is amply supported by the evidence as to sole proximate
cause, the additional issue of imputed negligence in like
manner bars plaintiff's recovery. We submit this latter
proposition, in view of the fact that plaintiff raised the
question in her brief, although the findings of the court
do not deal with it.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
GRANT C. AADNESEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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